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commander. The author’s penchant for asides on minor characters or 
ephemeral details amplifies the organizational problems presented by 
these twin narratives. For example, after noting that Dodge’s chief of 
scouts in 1863 was from the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, Morgans sets off 
on a page-long excursion on the Seventh’s history that manages to 
encompass “Bleeding Kansas,” William “Buffalo Bill” Cody, future 
Kansas governor Edmund Needham Morrill, and Susan B. Anthony 
(110–11). Dodge often gets lost in these details. The result is an inter-
esting but at times exasperating study of Iowa’s most famous Civil 
War general. 
 
 
Engineering Victory: The Union Siege of Vicksburg, by Justin S. Solonick. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2015. ix, 289 pp. Illus-
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Reviewer Mark Barloon is senior lecturer of history at Central College. His Ph.D. 
dissertation (University of North Texas, 2001) was “Combat Reconsidered: A 
Statistical Analysis of Small-Unit Actions during the American Civil War.” 
The Vicksburg Campaign was the critical moment of the American 
Civil War. Federal success depended on the intelligence and improvi-
sational skill of the midwesterners who filled the ranks of Major Gen-
eral Ulysses S. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee. Because they had only 
three professional engineers to guide them, Grant’s soldiers were forced 
to apply their own creativity and common sense to the problem of 
besieging the enemy. Consequently, Confederate Lieutenant General 
John C. Pemberton was forced to surrender his army. He did not sur-
render because his men had depleted their supplies but rather because 
their defensive works had been compromised by Grant’s crafty, self-
educated, soldiers-turned-engineers. Although the soldiers performed 
exceptionally, their siege tactics were not exceptional; they resembled 
the siegecraft of seventeenth-century French Marshal Vauban more than 
the modern trench warfare of World War I. 
 These are the arguments made by historian Justin Solonick, who 
received his Ph.D. in 2013 under the tutelage of Steven Woodworth at 
Texas Christian University. In this book, Solonick enters into three 
separate scholarly debates regarding Vicksburg and the Civil War. 
First, he reinforces his mentor’s belief that the West was the critical 
theater of the war and that westerners made better soldiers than east-
erners. Second, he advances Michael Ballard’s suggestion that the 
Confederates did not surrender because of a lack of supplies. Instead, 
it was the Federals’ relentless advancement of their trenches that forced 
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Pemberton to recognize the futility of his position and surrender. 
Finally, Solonick enters into the scholarly debate started by John Ma-
hon regarding the modernity of Civil War combat. Solonick concludes 
that the siege of Vicksburg did not presage World War I trench war-
fare; rather, it looked more like the Vaubanian sieges of the 1670s. 
 There is a lot to like about this book. Solonick demonstrates skill 
as both a researcher and a writer. He has scoured archives from New 
York to North Carolina in his search for snippets regarding the technical 
aspects of the Federal siege. He is equally disciplined in his writing. His 
text is muscular and concise, aided by a logical progression of chap-
ters, with cogent summaries at the end of each. Furthermore, his apt 
use of pictures, maps, and diagrams helps readers understand both 
the theoretical and real world aspects of the siege. 
 Of course, no book is perfect. One disturbing mistake can be found 
on the first page. There, and throughout the book, Solonick cites Charles 
Hobbs’s important memoir of the Vicksburg Campaign, yet he fails to 
include it in his bibliography. Although this omission may be nothing 
more than an editorial lapse, it causes readers to doubt the integrity of 
the work. (Let me hasten to add that the overall quality of Solonick’s 
monograph is excellent, suggesting that this gaffe is simply an unfor-
tunate mistake.) More troubling, however, are Solonick’s repeated 
claims that Grant’s western soldiers were uniquely qualified to con-
duct this siege. Throughout the book he describes the Federal soldiers 
using phrases like “can-do attitude” (2), “western exceptionalism” (3), 
“western improvisation” (77), “soldier improvisation” (176), and “sol-
dier ingenuity” (215). He implies that Grant’s midwesterners were 
more capable of becoming amateur military engineers than other Fed-
eral soldiers, yet he fails to compare their improvisational abilities 
with those of other Federals in other armies. Again, this quibble does 
not cripple his work, but Solonick would be more persuasive if he 
understated rather than overstated his “midwestern exceptionalism” 
argument. 
 On the whole, Engineering Victory is a fine examination of the siege 
tactics used by the Federals at Vicksburg. It presents the complex story 
of Grant’s efforts to topple the “Gibraltar of the West” in a clear and co-
herent manner. Regardless of whether you agree with all of Solonick’s 
arguments, it is difficult to disagree with him when he concludes that 
the soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee outperformed their Confed-
erate counterparts at Vicksburg. 
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From Southern Illinois University’s superb Concise Lincoln Library 
series come two volumes that examine parallel and seminal events in 
Abraham Lincoln’s presidency: the complex and often difficult path 
he pursued toward embracing emancipation as a central Union war 
aim and his embrace of the Thirteenth Amendment as the best means 
to finally eradicate once and for all the institution of American slavery. 
 Few subjects in Lincoln scholarship are as controversial as eman-
cipation. To her credit, Edna Greene Medford brings to the task a bal-
anced and well-informed perspective. Her Lincoln is neither saint nor 
sinner but a well-meaning man whose views on race and emancipa-
tion were essentially moderate and evolved over time. “Lincoln fol-
lowed a less urgent and more detached path than the revolutionaries” 
like Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner, she writes, and “while he saw 
advantage in gradual and peaceful abolition, the war escalated his 
timetable and altered his approach” (3). 
 Medford is careful to set Lincoln within the context of his times, 
particularly the volatile sectional politics of the 1850s, during which 
“Lincoln honed his argument in opposition to the expansion of slavery 
and availed himself of the opportunities presented to share his views” 
(23). Consistently denouncing the evils of slavery but just as consis-
tently expressing misgivings about the possibility of a mixed-race 
American society and denying that anyone could properly interfere 
with the property rights of slaveholding white Southerners, Lincoln’s 
arguments “comforted moderates” but alienated abolitionists (24). 
 During the war President Lincoln began by insisting on keeping 
slavery at arm’s length, denying that the war was fundamentally 
about emancipation and supporting various gradualist antislavery 
schemes involving compensating white slaveholders and colonizing 
freed slaves out of the United States. But the war increasingly radical-
ized Lincoln. In the end he embraced not only emancipation as a war 
policy, but also the absolute end to slavery via constitutional amend-
ment—a remarkable evolution. 
